

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 04154

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 16, 1978  
(SALT TWO-1661)

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 16, 1978

- I

ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF EFFECTIVE AND MEANINGFUL  
OBLIGATIONS PROVIDING FOR A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF MISSILES  
WOULD BE A NEW AND MAJOR STEP IN THE PROCESS OF CURBING  
THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, STRENGTHENING  
STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR  
WAR. THIS REFERS TO THE AGREED RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF  
THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT, AND ALSO TO ARTICLE II OF THE  
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE PROVISIONS BEING  
WORKED OUT FOR ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL MUST NOT FAIL  
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TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ACTUALLY EXISTING SITUATION IN  
THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION AND MUST BE IN COMPLETE AND  
BALANCED ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL  
SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE,  
WHICH LIES AT THE BASIS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

- II

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS PROVIDED EXTENSIVE AND THOROUGHLY WEIGHED RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF BANNING NEW TYPES OF SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS--UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL.

EXPANDING UPON THE CONSIDERATIONS WE HAVE PRESENTED AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING.

THE SIDES HAVE ALREADY REACHED A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL.

WE HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE UPON THE OBLIGATION NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST NEW TYPES OF SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS AND NOT TO DEPLOY SUCH NEW TYPES OF SLBMS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROPOSAL ADVANCED REGARDING AN EXCEPTION FOR ONE NEW TYPE OF SLBM FOR EACH SIDE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL, THE SOVIET SIDE EXPRESSED ITS AGREEMENT TO RECORD IN THE DRAFT PROTOCOL A CORRESPONDING PROVISION CONTAINING A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION OF THIS  
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QUESTION.

FOR THE U.S. THIS NEW TYPE IS THE TRIDENT C-4 SLBM.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THIS AREA, FOR THE SOVIET UNION THE EXCEPTION UNDER ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL APPLIES TO THE RSM-52 SLBM. THE RSM-52 MISSILE IS A MIRVED SLBM BEING DEVELOPED FOR THE TYPHOON CLASS MISSILE SUBMARINES, WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE U.S. TRIDENT C-4 MIRVED SLBM BEING DEVELOPED FOR THE OHIO CLASS MISSILE SUBMARINES. AS YOU KNOW, A GREAT DEAL OF WORK HAS BEEN DONE ON BOTH OF THESE SLBMS.

AS FOR THE RSM-50 SLBM MENTIONED BY THE U.S. SIDE, THIS SLBM HAS BEEN RECORDED IN THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE TREATY AS AN EXISTING SLBM. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED WITH MIRVS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS MISSILE IS UNDERWAY. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN FURTHER THAT THE RSM-50 MISSILE BEING DEPLOYED IN THE USSR, AS WELL AS THE U.S. POSEIDON C-3 MISSILE, WHICH IS ALSO INCLUDED IN THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE

JOINT TEXT OF THE DRAFT TREATY, ARE THE FIRST SLBMS OF THE SIDES, WHICH WERE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, AND IN THIS RESPECT THEY ARE COMPARABLE.

THUS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE TREATY, RSM-50 AND POSEIDON C-3 SLBM LAUNCHERS ARE SUBJECT TO BEING COUNTED WITHIN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE V, PARS. 1 AND 2, OF THE TREATY, I.E., THEY ARE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS FOR THE ENTIRE TERM OF THE TREATY

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EXDIS USSALTTWO

THROUGH 1985, RATHER THAN THE THREE-YEAR TERM OF THE PROTOCOL.

IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 2, OF THE PROTOCOL MENTION HAS BEEN MADE HERE OF THE QUESTION OF SOVIET SLBMS CALLED SS-N-17 IN THE U.S. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THIS REFERS TO THE EXPERIMENTAL MISSILES INSTALLED ON ONE SUBMARINE. DEPLOYMENT OF THESE MISSILES IN THE FUTURE IS NOT ENVISAGED.

- III

NOW ON THE QUESTION OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL.

THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE IS THAT FOR THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW

TYPES OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WOULD BE BANNED FOR BOTH SIDES. AND HERE THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES COINCIDE.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD, THE USSR  
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DELEGATION HAS ADVANCED A PROPOSAL ON BANNING THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH MRVS.

IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO TABLED A PROPOSAL ON BANNING, UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL, FLIGHT-TESTS AND DEPLOYMENT OF ALL NEW TYPES OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE--I REPEAT, ONE--NEW TYPE OF ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE FOR EACH SIDE. THIS IS A CONSTRUCTIVE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL WHICH, IN THE EVENT OF CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, FOR THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FLIGHT-TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ANY OTHER NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE, EXCEPT FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED ONE NEW TYPE OF SUCH AN ICBM.

THE REASONS FOR THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED HERE IN DETAIL.

UNDER THE SOVIET APPROACH WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE OTHER SIDE, IN BANNING THE EQUIPPING OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WITH INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES, IT IS ALSO INTENDED TO BAN THE INSTALLATION THEREON OF SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS OR OTHER DEVICES MENTIONED IN THE RELEVANT AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 5, OF THE TREATY. INSTALLATION OF SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISMS AND OTHER DEVICES INTENDED FOR MIRVS WOULD ALSO BE BANNED ON ANY ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE.

IN THE INTERESTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS CONCERNING A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO TABLED CLEAR  
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PROPOSALS ON THE QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL.

UNDER THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH, NEW TYPES OF ICBMS

INCLUDE ALL TYPES OF ICBMS, THE FLIGHT-TESTS OF WHICH WERE INITIATED AFTER 1976. ALSO CONSIDERED TO BE NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WOULD BE ICBMS WHICH, COMPARED TO THE EXISTING ONES, HAD THEIR EXTERNALLY OBSERVABLE DIMENSIONS OR THE NUMBER OF THEIR STAGES CHANGED, OR HAD THEIR LAUNCH-WEIGHT OR THROW-WEIGHT INCREASED, OR HAD SUCH CHANGES MADE IN ANY COMBINATION.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RELEVANT AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT, THIS GIVES THE SIDES EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH ICBMS OF NEW TYPES IN A MANNER VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH WHICH INTRODUCES IRRELEVANT ELEMENTS WOULD BY NO MEANS MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF ENSURING VERIFIABILITY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED, AND WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE ARBITRARY AND SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE U.S. SIDE IS AWARE OF OUR CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS CONNECTION.

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS BOTH SIDES HAVE SAID CLEARLY AND REPEATEDLY THAT ARTICLE X OF THE DRAFT TREATY, CONCERNING MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IS AGREED.

FURTHERMORE, THE RELEVANT AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY ALSO RECORD LIMITATIONS ON MODERNIZATION OF

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7361

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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EXDIS USSALTTWO

EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THESE PROVISIONS, ALSO REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED BY THE SIDES, ARE FULLY BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON ESTABLISHING IN ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS EFFECTIVE OBLIGATIONS AIMED AT BANNING FLIGHT-TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF MISSILES HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED HERE.

AS FOR FURTHER MEASURES OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES AND SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND ALSO ON MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THESE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS AREA THE SIDES HAVE CLOSE, AND IN FACT OVERLAPPING PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE RECORDED IN THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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ALL THIS, TAKEN TOGETHER, ESTABLISHES AN ORDER FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE SIDES, AIMED AT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IN A QUALITATIVE RESPECT AS WELL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, ENSURING THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS OF THE SIDES IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION.

- V

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE TASKS PUT BEFORE THE DELEGATIONS, A RECIPROCAL CONSTRUCTIVE MOVEMENT WILL BE MADE BY THE U.S. SIDE ON QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT, WHICH WERE ADDRESSED IN THE USSR DELEGATION'S STATEMENT. EARLE

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## Message Attributes

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